倫敦遊學-自助家遊學網

          嚇阻與核戰略 Mutual Deterrence and Nuclear Strategy models and three crises Ta-chen Cheng Abstract In this paper, the author presents theoretical models of mutual deterrence and nuclear strategy for case studies of the three PRC-US military confrontations in the 1950s, i.e., the Korean War, the first and second Taiwan Strait crises. Key words: mutual deterrence, nuclear strategy, the Korean War, the first Taiwan Strait crisis, the second Taiwan Strait crisis, United States, People’s Republic of China Introduction It is reasonable to argue that both mutual deterrence and nuclear strategy have never been formulated in an isolated environment, and their natures have always been combinations of various factors such as history, politics, culture, and most importantly, international relations. Such national variance, however, shall not prevent ambitious researchers from exploring rational dimensions and analytical patterns. As such, as this paper will enumerate, the author will focus on the rational aspect of mutual deterrence and nuclear strategy, and try to find out certain models for interpretation. In the first part of this paper, the author focuses on the rational aspect of mutual deterrence and nuclear strategy by developing models for analysis. In the second part, three military confrontations between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and United States (US) will be theoretically analysed according to these models. The invention and application of theories and models are original, and it is the author’s wish to encourage serious discussions from the readers. Theories and Models In no sense can scientific models and theories for intellectual accumulation be established without proper basis. The theories and models introduced in this paper are as such founded upon a general acceptance of deterrence theories. Admittedly, however, deterrence concepts from various theorists, heterogeneous in kinds as can be envisaged, represent an enormous pool of ideas. The author, without intentions to include or accept all of them, selects several useful points as foundations to produce models and theories as follows. 租辦公室In this paper, the actors of mutual deterrence and nuclear strategy are limited only to states. Despite national diversities, decision-makers are in general rational, and the selection of nuclear/military policy is from several rational options provided by civilian or military strategists. In other words, mutual deterrence and nuclear strategy are products of rationality, and decision-makers calculate national interests discreetly, even when they are under immediate threat. Moreover, mutual deterrence, which serves better interests of a state, comprises two main dimensions: credibility and capacity. While credibility mostly means psychological and political influences, capacity refers to more than the physical impact, and includes the real force to materialise military commitments or threat. In general, capacity is the foundation of credibility, and credibility increases in proportion to capacity.[1] Table.1 Two Dimensions of Military Deterrence credibility capacity nature psychological physical major implication political military Both credibility and capacity have nuclear and conventional components, with the former far more appalling than the latter. Nuclear Credibility means the will, threat or inclination of a state to use nuclear weapons, while Nuclear Capacity implies the real nuclear stockpiles to employ. By contrast, Conventional Credibility refers to the will, threat or inclination to use conventional forces, and Conventional Capacity is the conventional strength to achieve. For a nuclear weapons state, its Credibility includes nuclear and conventional elements, so does its Capacity. To a non-nuclear weapons state, its own nuclear Credibility and Capacity do not exist, but it may enjoy certain benefit of nuclear umbrella effect from other nuclear powers. There are different national interests to a state, which can rationally, but not necessarily independently, chooses the military means in different places according to separate considerations on its national interests. In this paper, the author categories places with non-identical national interests into four groups: Homeland, Places with vital interests (PVI), Places with unessential interests (PUI), and Other Places(OP). By author’s definition, Homeland means the territory of a state. If being attacked, thi 租房子s state will exercise all possible means for retaliation, likely in proportion to the degree of attack. When it comes to nuclear invasions, a nuclear weapons state will need to demonstrate its capacity and credibility, nuclear and conventional to defend its own territory. Places with vital interests (PVI) refer to some points or areas abroad which have significant strategic values to a state. There are usually close political, historical, cultural or economic connections between this state and its Places with vital interests. The Middle East to many Western countries is of such kind of strategic significance. This status, however, does not always remain unchanged, and may vary over time. For example, many colonies are no longer PVIs to Britain today. In terms of mutual deterrence, if PVIs of a nuclear weapons state were attacked, this power will express its strong concern and inclination to intervene by conventional forces, and will not exclude the possibility to use nuclear threat against invasions, i.e., to exercise its nuclear credibility. It will not, however, easily use its own nuclear capacity in order to avoid a general or escalated nuclear war. The only exceptional scenario is that some PVIs have been attacked by nuclear weapons, and this nuclear power is bound by a military treaty or other substantial defence agreements, which require the use of nuclear weapons. Yet even so, there is still no absolute guarantee that this power will employ its nuclear capacity at all. The scepticism and worries expressed by the Europeans on American nuclear commitment during the Cold War period can explain this point. Whether or not this power will honour its commitments to PVIs is purely out of its own consideration on national interests, not on morality or other ethic reasons at the time of conflicts. Places with unessential interests (PUI) are those tactical areas with somewhat political, economic or military interests, but without crucial strategic values. Nuclear weapons states will normally avoid nuclear conflicts in these places. No nuclear commitment therefore can be expected. However, a state may engage in a conventional warfare in order to protect its interests in these places. For Other Places (OP), which comprise places other than three categories mentioned above, nuclear weapons states will unlikel 住商房屋y offer any substantial military commitment, namely capacity. Nevertheless, in some cases, in order to expand its sphere of interests, this state may demonstrate its conventional credibility on them, probably in the names of humanitarian aids or counterterrorism. Table.2 Relations of Capacity and Credibility with Different Places Homeland PVI PUI OP Nuclear Capacity √ Nuclear Credibility √ Conventional Capacity √ Conventional Credibility √ Accordingly, several simple two-dimensional figures can illustrate deterrence relations in the following pages. Before further analysis, there are some other notions that need to be clarified. Firstly, military development is not always linear and progressive. It might sometimes fluctuate or even go backward. The reason that author uses smooth straight lines just to simplify the whole process of evolution. Actually, in the long run, some fluctuations will not be so notable as first seen, and could be ignored in a macro viewpoint. Secondly, military development of a state is never static but dynamic. That means at a given time, different countries may very likely have separate military developments, or similar military developments of two countries can possibly occur in different periods. The reason that the author puts development lines of two states in one figure is to compare their routes of evolution. This is not, as previously noted, to assume that such developments occurred at the same time. Finally, the author has to admit that the degree of credibility or capability is not easy to be shown by absolute numbers. It can, however, be understood that by comparison, there is still a numerical order on both scales. Fig.1 Nuclear Deterrence for Homeland As illustrated, the deterrent development of a state is shown as the red line, called as Line of Deterrence (LOD). Axes Y and X represent the degrees of credibility and capability without absolute numbers respectively. Horizontal Line C1 is named as a standard of Hard Nuclear Deterrence (HND), which means the state has obtained sufficient nuclear deterrent for its Homeland. Such deterrence should at least include the capacity of resisting the first strike and launching the second strike for the Ho 裝潢meland. In practice, that when a state gets across this threshold depends on the case-by-case basis. Some countries may merely need the Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) or bombers, but some may need Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) or SLBM (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles). Considerations of who the adversaries are and what weapons they have are crucial to decide this standard. Point T, which is the convergence of LOD and Line C1, separates military development stages of a state, i.e., Stage a (Sa) and Stage b (Sb), before and after its acquisition of HND. Before LOD reaches Line C1, this state has not yet acquired sufficient nuclear deterrent, so that limited and conventional war is a more acceptable option to the decision-makers if a military conflict or war is inevitable on its Homeland. While passing this threshold, further nuclear development can only generate marginal effects of deterrence for this nuclear power’s Homeland. More investment on nuclear capacity cannot provide additional credibility as well. The reason is not difficult to understand: If ten nuclear weapons are sufficient for Homeland defence, a hundred will not make a bigger difference than that. It would be helpful to add some more discussion about Line C1 here. Firstly, Line C1 varies time to time. However, the change of Line C1, which does not simply refer to ordinary upgrades of weapons, involves in significant developments of not only the nuclear warheads, but also their delivery and countermeasure systems. Secondly, the creation of Line C1 is basically out of mutual deterrence. That means it has to be decided by bilateral, or in some more complicated cases, multilateral relations, Fig. 2 Deterrence in the Places with Vital Interests In PVIs, the increase of nuclear capacity will accordingly enhance nuclear credibility of this nuclear weapons state after passing the threshold Line C1. This phenomenon is commonly called as the effect of “nuclear umbrella”. There is a threshold of the nuclear development in PVIs as well, and is shown as Line C2, which refers to a certain nuclear sufficiency of this nuclear power in one of its PVIs, say Place X. Because Line C2 is a spillover effect, it cannot be established before Line C1. Another fundamental difference between Lines C1 關鍵字廣告and C2 is that Line C2 is not generated by this nuclear state and its enemies only. The Place X itself has some influences in the formulation of Line C2. But it is possible that if Place X is the PVI of more than one nuclear powers, the establishment of Line C2 will still be mostly the product of mutual deterrence between or among nuclear powers. More features of Line C2 will be discussed later. Fig. 3 Deterrence in the PUIs and OPs In PUIs and OPs, as shown above, the use of nuclear weapons is unlikely because these places are less important to this nuclear power. The increase of conventional capacity will proportionally add credibility after passing its threshold of Line C1 in this Place however. Thanks to the exclusion of nuclear options, LOD is not possible to reach Line C2, which watermarks the distinction between nuclear and conventional deterrence of this nuclear power in PUIs and OPs. Fig. 4 Combined Deterrence for the Homeland In Figure 1, conventional development has not been considered into LOD. If nuclear and conventional deterrents of a state have been considered as a whole, they would be shown as Figure 4. Despite the marginality of nuclear development, it is found that there is some increase of credibility for the Homeland in Stage b. Such an increase is mostly out of the improvement of conventional forces. Fig. 5 Bilateral Deterrence in a PVI, X From Figure 5, it is clearly observed that these two nuclear weapons states (State A and State B) have both reached the nuclear threshold, Line C2 in Place X. Line C2 is called as the standard of Soft Nuclear Deterrence (SND), which means each of the nuclear states can effectively exercise its nuclear deterrence in Place X. Similar to HND, SND is not absolute at all, and it may change if there is a significant promotion of nuclear technology at either side. A simple comparison, as the author believes, can help readers understand about the nature of Lines C1 and C2. Table.3 Natures of Lines C1 and C2 Line C1 Line C2 Place of occurrence Homeland PVI Timing of occurrence Prior Later Nature of Deterrence Hard Nuclear Deterrence (with nuclear capacity and credibility) 禮服Soft Nuclear Deterrence (with nuclear credibility) Concerned Parties Competing nuclear powers Competing nuclear powers and the PVI itself Case Studies: three crises Fig.6 USSR’s Converted SND in China in the 1950s In the 1950s, without national nuclear weapons, the effectiveness of the Soviet Soft Nuclear Deterrence (SND) played an important role in China’s military actions.[2] In Figure 6, after the Soviet Union had reached Line C2 in China, which was then one of its PVI, the Soviet nuclear capacity over China, namely SND would be converted to enhance Chinese military deterrence due to the 1950 bilateral defence treaty between these two Communist countries and more importantly, political need. Although the PRC in this period possessed only conventional forces, the nuclear umbrella effect considerably promoted the PRC’s deterrence, shown as PRC’s dotted line. This enhanced deterrence also substantially narrowed the military gap between the US and PRC. Such projection of nuclear deterrence from Moscow, as shown in Figure 7 even with different degree of reliability, lasted until the break-up with the Soviets.[3] However, according to theories and models discussed previously, Soviet SND would make real sense only if the PRC were suffering nuclear attacks. Fig.7 China’s Assumption of Sino-American Deterrence in China in the 1950s In such context, the author would like to examine three Sino-American crises in the 1950s: the Korean War (1950-3), the first (1954-5) and second (1958) Taiwan Strait crises. None of them was eventually escalated into a nuclear scale of war, but nuclear scenarios were considered by both sides in every situation with different emphasis. The Korean War The Korean War, called by the Chinese Communists as “the War of Resisting the US and Aiding the North Korea” (Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng) is the first large regional war after WW II. Mao asserted on 12 September 1953 that in the Korean War, the PRC had learned some significant lessons and expressed his view on the international trend after War.[4] He specifically mentioned of “the policy of benevolence” covering those of the PRC’s PVIs. Similar to America’s commitment to South Korea and Japan, there was no doubt that both the US and PRC valued the K 酒肉朋友orea peninsula as a PVI. In terms of military deterrent, the US had already been a super power with increasing nuclear stockpiles, but the PRC had only exhausted troops and outdated conventional armament after the Chinese Civil War (1946-1949). During the course of war, proposals of using atomic bombs were continuously raised in Washington although eventually the Americans decided not to escalate to that level. Without real employment of nuclear weapons, however, President Eisenhower, in his memoirs, Mandate for Change believed that it was US nuclear deterrent drawing the Chinese to the negotiation table.[5] According to American assumptions, the strategic confrontation should be like Figure 8, in which US forces with nuclear deterrent went against Chinese outmoded conventional forces. Fig.8 American Assumptions of the US-PRC Confrontation in Korea For some analysts, however, the 1950 treaty between the Moscow and Beijing has undeniably produced a major deterrence, which prevented the PRC from American nuclear attacks. Backed by Soviet SND, the PRC could well rest its war plans under Soviet nuclear umbrella shown as Figure 9. Even so, there was still a huge military gap between the US and an enhanced PRC LODs, mostly due to China’s lag of advanced conventional weapons. Fig.9 Chinese Assumptions of the US vs. PRC Confrontation in Korea The worst-case scenario that the US would least like to expect was direct Soviet military involvement in the Korean War. In Figure 10, there was little doubt that LOD of the US is higher than that of the PRC, or even that of the USSR in Korea because of America’s technological superiority, nuclear and conventional, in this period. However, it was also very likely that the USSR and PRC military combination might be stronger than America military presence. As such, it would not be proper to wipe out, if possibly, the PRC/ North Korea forces off the Korea peninsula since that the USSR, which had no other deputy troops to send, might be forced to intervene then. The military superiority in Figure 8 or 9 would be reversed to a disadvantageous Figure 10. Meanwhile, American electorates were increasingly becoming less and less tolerant towards this protracted campaign. This was the reason why to the US Government, armistice negotiation with the PRC was of necessity even though 澎湖民宿the Chinese were retreating. Fig.10 USSR/PRC vs. US Deterrence in Korea Despite the bloody combats in the battlefields, it should be noted that the US had somehow expressed sort of self-constraint during the process of war. Indeed, American attitude towards the PRC was relatively cautious, particularly after the relief of MacArthur. President Truman had made it clear that he did not want to expand the scope of war so that he rejected Chiang Kai-shek’s proposal of using Kuomintang (KMT) armies in Korea. With this, however, the PRC still suffered a tremendous loss in the Korean War. Its political archrival, Chiang’s KMT by contrast benefited much from this confrontation by US announcement on continuing military and political support to Taiwan, although these had not been realised as a chance to recover Mainland China. The first Taiwan Strait crises The struggles between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and KMT have been a long story. Since 1949, while the CCP consolidating its grip in Mainland China, the exiled KMT had still held Taiwan (Formosa), Penghu (Pescadores Islands), Jinmen (Quemoy) and Mazu (Matsu) islands as bases for a comeback. After the Korean War, Taiwan question had become a perturbation in the US and PRC strained relationship, which was later tested by two serious CCP vs. KMT military confrontations with American involvement. In both occasions, the US responded with military actions, including nuclear threats, to support Chiang’s position. But due to Taiwan’s declining value to the US, Washington’s nuclear deterrence was remarkably diminishing. Americans’ attitude towards Taiwan was not always consistent. After failing to mediate between the CCP and KMT, President Truman was determined to avoid further involvement in the Chinese Civil War and prepared to abandon Chiang Kai-shek’s regime. In the 1948 election year, Truman was harshly under attack by the Republicans, who charged that Roosevelt had sold out East Europe and Truman had tried to sell out China. Being afraid that Congress would vote against his European Security plan, Truman was grudgingly obliged to keep on providing the KMT with economic and military aids. Two weeks after his being elected, however, he abruptly turned down Chiang’s request 褐藻醣膠 for more aids. On 5 January 1950, President Truman announced that Taiwan was a part of China and the US will not involve in the disputes in the Taiwan Strait. Such announcement implied that the US would not intervene and provide military assistance to the KMT troops if the PLA were to attack Taiwan. His Secretary of State, Dean Acheson also excluded Taiwan from the US defence zone in the pacific region in a statement of 12 January. Simply speaking, before the outbreak of the Korean War, Taiwan was at most classified as one of US Places with unessential interests even though Washington still kept its diplomatic ties with Taipei. According to models discussed previously, all American deterrents against the Communist bloc for Taiwan would be conventional. Fig.11 US Deterrence in Taiwan before the Korean War Knowing this, the PRC started to mobilise its Huadong and Xibei Field Armies in Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces for military attack on Taiwan. When the Korean War broke out in June 1950, nevertheless, President Truman drastically changed his tones and reacted immediately by declaring the neutralisation of the Taiwan Strait on 27 June, which denied the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan. The Seventh Fleet was sent to the Strait under orders to prevent any invasion to Taiwan, but such action also deterred KMT troops from attacking on Mainland China. In January 1951, the US government resumed its military aids to Taiwan. The Mutual Defence and Assistance Agreement with Taipei was signed on 10 February. A Military Assistant Advisory Group (MAAG) was also dispatched to Taiwan and began operation in May. From then on, Taiwan was under de facto military protection of the US and became a part of the Western camp in the cold war structure. The Korean War was indeed a genuine turning point, which altered the fate of the KMT regime.        The US furthermore declared the doctrine of massive retaliation, proposed by Secretary of State John F. Dulles after the armistice of the Korean War. The American Government also clearly pointed out that it would not allow any other new aggression “like that in Korea, or if the Korean War itself were resumed, the US would not feel bound again to restrict to non-use of nuclear weapons.”[6] In other words, under this doctrine, the .msgcontent .wsharing ul li { text-indent: 0; } 分享 Facebook Plurk YAHOO! 永慶房屋  .