倫敦遊學-自助家遊學網

          Forever at the Frontline KNLA Forever at the Frontline By SAW YAN NAING Friday, January 30, 2009 January 31 marks the 60th anniversary of one of Asia’s oldest rebel movements—the Karen National Union (KNU). It is a day commemorated by Karen people all around the world. Since it declared war on the central government in 1949—shortly after Burma declared independence from Great Britain—the KNU has faced a great many ups and downs during its six-decade fight for autonomy. It is undergone rifts and splits, and breakaway Karen groups have emerged. It suffered defeat at the hands of the Burmese army and in 1995 was forced to abandon its jungle fortress at Manerplaw on the Thai- Burmese border. Its aging leadership is fadi 借錢ng away while the number of Karen refugees continues to grow. Discontent is high among the Karen population and thousands of families are currently resettling in Western countries under the auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee (UNHCR). However, unlike so many other armed insurgent groups, the KNU has steadfastly refused to sign a ceasefire agreement with the Rangoon government. When the KNU’s founding father, Saw Ba U Gyi, established the rebel movement in 1949, he unveiled his “Four Principles” of resistance: “There shall be no surrender; The recognition of the Karen State must be completed; We shall retain our arms; and We shall decide 賣房子 our own political destiny.” The KNU has locked itself to those principles through thick and thin for 60 years. In 1995, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) split from the KNU and joined forces with the Burmese army. Manerplaw fell soon after. The KNU, led by Gen Bo Mya, scattered while its civilian population joined the exodus into Thai border refugee camps. The KNU lost their only true sources of income: logging and taxation. After fighting the Burmese army for 30 years, KNU commander Tha Mu He and hundreds of his followers surrendered to the regime in April 1997. He told journalists and diplomats that he split from the KNU because of the failed peace talks betw 襯衫een the Burmese junta and his mother organization in 1994 and the realization that the conflict would continue indefinitely. One year later, Phado Aung San, a central executive member of the KNU, and hundreds of his followers also surrendered to the Rangoon government. He gave the same reasons for laying down his weapons as Tha Mu He had. Then in early 2007, another splinter group reached a ceasefire agreement with the Burmese regime. Known as the KNU/ KNLA Peace Council and led by Maj-Gen Htein Maung, it included around 300 defecting KNU soldiers. Brig-Gen Johnny, head of KNLA Brigade 7, said that Karen breakaway leaders who had reached ceasefire agreements with the Burmese regime had betrayed 濾桶 their people and their comrades who had died for the Karen revolution. “We have to carry on the unfinished duty for our people. If we give up, it is as if we were betraying our comrades and our leaders who have died for us,” said Brig-Gen Johnny. “Our enemy [the Burmese military regime] is trying to divide us every day. We have to be united and always be careful,” he said. Meanwhile, the DKBA has boasted that its forces will overrun the KNU’s military wing, the KNLA, by 2010. The target of its operation would appear to be Kawkareik Township in southern Karen State, which is rich in gold, teak forest, antimony, zinc and tin. Sources from both the KNU and the DKBA circles have said that the D 土地買賣KBA seeks to control the regions that do business with the Thai authorities. However, the KNU leadership, as always, remains resolute.KNLA Battalion 201 Maj Bu Paw acknowledged recently that the DKBA would attack his battalion in Kawkareik and try to seize its military bases, but stated: “The DKBA can not defeat us.”  Assassinations among the KNU and the breakaways groups have increased since 2007. On February 14 last year, KNU General-Secretary Mahn Shah was gunned down by two men at his home in Mae Sot, Thailand. Mahn Sha had been widely respected, not only by ethnic Karen people, but by most democratic alliance groups and individuals who have participated in the pro-democracy movement for Burma. Aung 融資 Thu Nyein, a Burmese political analyst and former senior leader of the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front, blogged: “It is necessary for the new KNU leadership to quickly stop the assassinations and divisions among Karen people. “It is time for the KNU to reestablish unity among the Karen people,” he said. The newly appointed joint secretary (1), Maj Hla Ngwe, admitted the divisions among KNU leaders and said that the Burmese regime had cleverly manipulated the KNU. “We have had weaknesses and divisions in the past. That is natural. It can happen in any party or organization. But, we should learn from these events and ensure it doesn’t happen in the future,” he said. Brig-Gen Johnny agreed, but was more cynical. “It is no 室內裝潢t because our enemy is clever, it is because we are not clever,” he said. Breakaway groups have been quick to criticizing their former patrons, claiming that they now enjoy improved living conditions. DKBA Chairman Tha Htoo Kyaw once said that the KNU had been poor since 1949. He said that his followers who had settled in Myaing Gyi Ngu village, on the bank of the Salween River, enjoyed peace, an improving economy, proper education and a healthcare system since splitting from the KNU. “The path we chose has been beneficial to the Karen in the area,” he was quoted as saying. Meanwhile, several voices from the overseas Karen community have been vocal in criticizing the KNU leadership for its inactivity in both the political and military arenas. 租房子 Some claim that the KNU’s policy of self-defense is not enough to protect the Karen civilians and the impact on Karen civilians who are internally displaced in Karen State. As the conflict between the Karen rebels and the Burmese army goes on, observers say the problem of internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees will continue unabated. There are about 451,000 IDPs in Karen State, according to a 2008-released report by the Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC). The report stated that since 1996 about 3,300 villages in Karen State have been destroyed by the Burmese army and its allies. Meanwhile, hundreds of Karen refugees from the nine refugee camps on the Thai-Burmese border resettle every year in third countries. About 32,000 refugees went overseas in 2 燒烤008, according to TBBC. “We want to say to the world that we only want peace,” said Myat San, an IDP from Ei Tu Hta camp on the banks of the Salween River. “We want to live in peace. We want to urge the world to push for the fall of military rule in Burma and create peace for us.”  According to Brig-Gen Johnny, the KNU and all the pro-democracy forces inside and outside Burma, including Buddhists monks and students, should speed up the movement for democracy in 2009 and boycott the junta’s multi-party election in 2010. “If the junta wins the election, we [the opposition] will continue to be under the boots of the Burmese army,” he said. “But if every single person knows their role in the democracy movement, the goal of the revolution will not be far away.” 房屋貸款  .

          CNF's first ever peace talk with junta 'positive'：Dr.Sui Khar Location Map of Chin State CNF's first ever peace talk with junta 'posit 西裝外套ive': Dr. Sui Khar News - NMG Monday, 19 March 2007  The first ever peace tal 西服ks between the Chin National Front and the Burmese military junta or the State Peace and Development Council la 信用卡代償st week on the Indo-Burma border has helped build trust between the two sides, according to a CNF leader.The first round of t 結婚alks was held in Rih town, Chin State on March 15 and 16. It was deemed as constructive by Dr Sui Khar, Joint General Secretary of the CNF." 售屋網;From my point of view, the talks were successful," said Dr Sui Khar, "I regard it as heading towards a positive path."The 10-member delegation o 酒店打工f the CNF was led by Dr Sui Khar and Mr Paulsitha while the representatives of the Burmese junta included Security Lieutenant Colonel Min Htain and Major Zaw Min Oo. "This 酒店經紀 time the talks were to build trust and closeness [between the two parties]. The two sides agreed to meet again. But we returned without any agreement on the exact date for the next me 信用卡代償eting," said Dr Sui Khar.The next round of talks between the two parties will be for ceasefire and reconciliation. It was the first ever talks to be held between the CNF and the Burmese military junta.T 買屋he CNF was formed on March 20, 1988 with the aim of setting up a democratic federal union and self-determination for the Chin people. The organization got stronger when Chin students joined it after the '88 uprising in 信用卡代償Burma.  .

          (轉貼)馬英九的兩道紅線 （本文寫給玉山週報第14期） 八八水災沖垮了劉兆玄，造就了吳敦義，在出人預料中內閣成了「劉下吳上」，不只跌破全國人民的眼鏡，恐怕連劉內閣的閣員也要有不知所以然的感慨。只是這個新內閣佈局是否能夠挽救聲望已經瀕臨崩潰的馬總統，外界並沒有看好的理由。 ●過渡內閣  其實，在馬英九理想的閣揆接班人選中，我在玉山週報早就說過應該是朱立倫，吳敦義絕非是馬英九的口袋人選，他之所以能夠在劉兆玄遭逢「政治土石流」時臨危 上任，當然也不是什麼時勢造英雄，畢竟吳敦義從來就沒有什麼「英雄」的事蹟可言，反而是孤鳥一人，所以他的出線看來不過是一個「過渡內閣」罷了，不可能為 馬英九的聲望再造奇蹟。雖然如此，但吳敦義的出線，卻也幫馬英九設下兩道「紅線」，一條是跨越兩岸的「政治紅線」，另一條則是跨越國內政治的「藍綠紅 線」。  就第一條兩岸的「政治紅線」來看，吳敦義一傳出要接任閣揆的消息之後，中國的媒體普遍看好兩岸關係可以因此而持續加溫?酒店打工A這恐怕是過度樂觀的期待。吳敦義過 去雖然4度跟隨吳伯雄前往中國訪問，並且2度參與胡錦濤的瀛台夜宴，但他畢竟是兩岸關係的外行，不可能把精力放在處理兩岸關係上，更何況兩岸議題是總統的 職權，閣揆不可能多所著墨，所以只因為吳敦義去過中國訪問，就以為兩岸關係要加溫，這可能是不切實際的期待。所以由在藍營中跟中國淵源不深的吳敦義出馬踩 紅線，應該是一個理想的對象。  事實上，馬英九上台一年來雖然在兩岸經貿上，採取許多開放性的措施，但實質上幫他聲望加分的情形並不多，這也使得馬英九必須重新評估對中國政策的開放利弊得失。  為此，從馬英九同意達賴來台，以及不反對高雄市電影節放映疆獨首領熱比婭的紀錄片，顯見馬英九是有意把這一年來過熱的兩岸關係降溫，這絕非是因為賴幸媛擔 任陸委會主委的關係，藍營與中國人士一直認為賴幸媛綠色背景，導致兩岸關係的開展處處受到制約，這可能太過於放大賴幸媛的角色，沒有馬英九背 術後面膜後支持，就不 可能有賴幸媛降溫的作法。所以內閣換新以後，賴幸媛即使也被撤換，也不會改變馬英九在任內對中國採取「政左經右」的「左統」路線。  第二條從踩「藍綠紅線」來看，八八水災之後民進黨主席蔡英文曾經放話說：「只要換掉劉揆，民進黨就可以和國民黨進行合作」。對一般人而言，民進黨願意與國 民黨合作，這絕對是好事一樁，但在馬英九聲望跌落谷底的時候，馬英九若與民進黨進行合作，權力反而可能旁落，甚至因此拉動民進黨的氣勢。所以馬英九找來跟 民進黨有著諸多恩怨情仇的吳敦義接任閣揆，無疑是宣示藍綠根本沒有合作空間，民進黨不必自抬身價，馬英九的動作，顯然是間接勸民進黨死了藍綠合作這條心。  從這兩條紅線來看，未來吳敦義勢必要面臨跟中國與綠營兩面作戰的情境，這也是藍營人士認為吳敦義的內閣將是「戰鬥內閣」的主因。只是，在馬英九聲望跌落谷底以後，吳敦義的「戰鬥內閣」是否會像網友所說：「走了爛貨來了個賤貨」，恐怕是值得拭 室內裝潢目以待。●劉內閣的解體 不管吳敦義未來能夠扮演什麼角色，他是否能夠不步上流內閣早夭的後塵，就已經足夠他如履薄冰了，當然這裡有必要了解一下劉內閣早夭的原因，其中主要因素有三︰  一是人民的反叛。去年金融海嘯發生時，劉內閣的組成雖然都是以國民黨過去的老官僚為主，對待新時代產生的新局勢，那批老官僚卻已顯露出他們的無能，即使如 此，但當時只有綠營人士開罵，藍營以及一般社會大眾還願意體諒新內閣缺乏應對新事務的經驗，希望再給他們一點時間，所以劉內閣還能安然過關。但今年的八八 水災，劉內閣置身事外式的救災態度，不止綠營批評，社會大眾也忍不住的開罵，整個人民已經有開始反叛的跡象，這已經注定劉內閣不可能再長命百歲。  二是藍營的反叛。劉內閣不只已經失去民心，連藍營的民意代表、群眾也加入反叛的行列，這就加深劉內閣的內外交相煎的壓力，其中尤以力挺宋楚瑜出列接替的聲 浪最大，這當然會讓馬英九有被下指導棋的危機感。一個總統外部已經失 酒店經紀去民心，內部又面臨同志的反叛，他如果還堅持留住劉兆玄，很可能在內外反叛結合的情況 下，不只劉揆保不住，可能還會讓他有提前變成跛腳總統的情形。  三是綠營的反叛。民進黨主席蔡英文先換劉兆玄再合作的言論，已經表明在野黨也不希望劉揆留任的聲音。馬英九在面臨內外反叛的情況下，又有在野黨要求換閣揆 的要求，劉兆玄想留任的空間已經幾乎完全被堵住，所以不管馬英九願不願意與民進黨合作，多少釋放出一點「善意」，這樣起碼可以緩和在野黨未來在重建災區過 程的阻力。只是馬英九選擇一個綠營最不滿意的吳敦義做為回應，反而像是對蔡英文倒打一把，未來蔡英文對新內閣是採取合作或對抗的策略，不必思考應該就知道 其結果。●吳敦義的「大內悍將」  雖然劉內閣早夭，但想在吳敦義身上找出什麼功績足以接任閣揆，也不容易，除了是「大內悍將」之外，實在沒什麼特殊之處。他從中國時報記者出身，到參選台北 市議員、南投縣長，再到高雄市長這些人盡皆知的從政經歷，以國民黨過去人才擠擠的情?信用卡代償峔茯搳A實在還輪不到吳敦義這個人在馬英九面臨執政危機時出來救駕。  就因為如此，許多人開始在想馬英九找吳敦義擔任閣揆的理由，想來想去，大概也只有這個「大內悍將」可以解釋馬英九的心思。吳敦義的「悍」法，民進黨人可以 細數一堆，例如他在立法院的得理不撓人，使得他跟立院同僚的交情可說是完全沒有，這也是民進黨人聽到吳敦義要接任閣揆，有人會直問：「國民黨無人嗎」的質 疑。  第二種「悍」法是他會對於報導不利於他的記者，直言警告，甚至直接打電話給媒體主管，要記者們小心一點。吳敦義出身中國時報的記者，他當然知道記者在外雖 然號稱「無冕王」，但媒體的生態仍然有層級節制的性質，所以從主管或報老闆之處著手，絕對可以讓記者收斂。自由時報的一些政治記者就老是吃過他的排頭。  吳敦義的第三種「悍」法就是絕對護著馬英九，從1998年他尋求高雄市長連任，跟當時選台北市長的馬英九形成「北馬南吳」的搭配之後，吳敦義雖然被謝長廷一舉擊敗，但當時他就已經押寶馬英九，10年來只要馬 燒烤英九出事，大概都可以看到吳敦義護馬的影子。  由於吳敦義全心押注馬英九，所以他跟國民黨內的連戰、吳伯雄、王金平系統，大致維持等距關係，沒有特別偏向誰，這應該也是馬英九看得上吳敦義的主因。  然而，也因為吳敦義在國民黨內是「孤鳥」一隻，所以接任閣揆以後，他能否獨當一面去面對各種挑戰，恐怕也沒多少人看好，在這種情形下，吳敦義未來可能尋求合縱連橫的對象，顯然只有兩條路可走： 一是，尋求與王金平的本土派合作。雖然吳敦義和王金平都是藍營內本省籍的政治人物，但王金平走的「本土路線」卻是依靠地方派系作為奧援，所以王金平在地方上的人脈可以說是相當厚實。  但吳敦義雖有本省籍的身份，但因為他過去所走的路徑偏向與外省籍的馬英九結盟，所以他在地方的實力並不厚實，這也是導致他的從政經歷除了家鄉的南投之外，難以在一個特定的地區持續的主因。  像吳敦義這樣一個尋求外省加持的本省籍政治人物，雖然有些像是連戰、吳伯雄這種「崔台菁」派的模式，但馬英九畢竟不是蔣經國，他現 關鍵字廣告在的權威沒有威權體制的 保護，完全靠個人魅力也不足以建立類似蔣家的權威模式，所以即使他想保劉，也無能為力。同樣的，吳敦義也不是連戰、吳伯雄，他們沒有完整的從政經歷，以及 貴族式的家世背景，完全要依靠個人在政壇上打拚獲取政治權力，並不是想像中的容易，所以擔任閣揆以後，如果不能改變以後「悍」的態度，想在閣揆的位置上有 所表現，恐怕也難。  在這個情形下，吳敦義首先勢必尋求與王金平合作，期望王金平能在立法院中助他一把，唯有擺平藍營立委的掣肘，吳敦義也才能接受民進黨立委的挑戰。  二是，吳敦義雖然在國民黨內是孤鳥一隻，但為了能在閣揆的位置上有所表現，必然也要跟連戰、吳伯雄等合作，才能擺脫孤鳥的現象。  問題是吳敦義若想與連、吳合作，又有多大的空間呢？恐怕是不大。就以吳伯雄的態度來看，吳伯雄一聽到吳敦義即將接任閣揆的消息，幾乎是沈默以對，沒有發表 評論，也沒有再進黨部的辦公室。吳伯雄應該知道吳敦義是馬英九的人馬，接任閣揆不可能對黨內親吳的系統有所重用，這就讓他不得不「沈默以對?辦公室出租v。反倒是吳敦 義上台，頗有宣示連戰、吳伯雄等「崔台菁」一代已經被世代交替掉了，未來他們想在政壇上發揮影響力的可能性，將會越來越小。●朱立倫的接班架勢 只是，不管吳敦義再怎麼護馬，也不可能改變他的血統，在「高級外省人」的思維下，吳敦義想在藍營開創一片天，除了要改一改祖宗牌位之外，只能不斷強調自己 的出身，這也是為何吳敦義要一直強調他是漳州人、太太是泉州人，媳婦是福州人的原因。但不管來自漳州或泉州，這個把百年前祖宗的身份，早已沒什麼特殊意 義，吳敦義在中國強調自己的出身，顯然是不想在國民黨內遭到排擠的意味。  即使如此，外界還是看得出朱立倫才是馬英九理想的接班人選，可惜的是朱立倫雖有外省籍的身份，但沒有中央的從政經驗，馬英九一時不敢把他放到閣揆位置，反而放在副閣揆位置加以歷練，免得他快速「生鏽」，讓馬英九以後手中沒有牌可以打。  問題是馬英九為何會獨衷於朱立倫呢？這其中有幾個原因： 一是，就像我在玉山週報寫過的，民進黨新潮流系的一批新秀們，他們跟馬英九、朱立倫的幕僚都有同窗?關鍵字行銷局芊A每個月他們固定在台北聚會，聊的話題幾乎都不會超 出台灣政治發展的範圍，所以馬、朱若不想走連戰、吳伯雄、王金平的路線，他們的幕僚可得藉助新系的想像力，這也是新系可以插手到國民黨家務事的「平台」。  二是，朱立倫的屬性跟馬英九最為接近，既不出風頭，也不像胡志強、郝龍斌那般的親中，這對馬英九想要維持「左統」路線，可能比較有機會。馬英九的「左統」 路線不外乎是堅持「中華民國」的價值，以及「反共不反中」的思想，在目前國民黨內一片「聯共制台」的思維下，泛藍人士跑中國就像跑廚房一樣，馬英九想在黨 內找出不親中者已經很難，而朱立倫背後有民進黨新系的影子，卻是他最好的保護傘。  就因為在馬英九的厚愛之下，朱立倫能夠不經過閣員的歷練，直接像坐直昇機一樣的從縣長到副閣揆的位置，這不只是國民黨的唯一，未來恐怕也不會有第二人。而馬英九這麼不忌諱的「厚愛」朱立倫，到底是不是正確的選擇，也只有留給時間來驗證了。 .msgcontent .wsharing ul li { text-indent: 0; } 分享 Facebook Plurk YAHOO! 訂做禮服  .

          嚇阻與核戰略 Mutual Deterrence and Nuclear Strategy models and three crises Ta-chen Cheng Abstract In this paper, the author presents theoretical models of mutual deterrence and nuclear strategy for case studies of the three PRC-US military confrontations in the 1950s, i.e., the Korean War, the first and second Taiwan Strait crises. Key words: mutual deterrence, nuclear strategy, the Korean War, the first Taiwan Strait crisis, the second Taiwan Strait crisis, United States, People’s Republic of China Introduction It is reasonable to argue that both mutual deterrence and nuclear strategy have never been formulated in an isolated environment, and their natures have always been combinations of various factors such as history, politics, culture, and most importantly, international relations. Such national variance, however, shall not prevent ambitious researchers from exploring rational dimensions and analytical patterns. As such, as this paper will enumerate, the author will focus on the rational aspect of mutual deterrence and nuclear strategy, and try to find out certain models for interpretation. In the first part of this paper, the author focuses on the rational aspect of mutual deterrence and nuclear strategy by developing models for analysis. In the second part, three military confrontations between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and United States (US) will be theoretically analysed according to these models. The invention and application of theories and models are original, and it is the author’s wish to encourage serious discussions from the readers. Theories and Models In no sense can scientific models and theories for intellectual accumulation be established without proper basis. The theories and models introduced in this paper are as such founded upon a general acceptance of deterrence theories. Admittedly, however, deterrence concepts from various theorists, heterogeneous in kinds as can be envisaged, represent an enormous pool of ideas. The author, without intentions to include or accept all of them, selects several useful points as foundations to produce models and theories as follows. 租辦公室In this paper, the actors of mutual deterrence and nuclear strategy are limited only to states. Despite national diversities, decision-makers are in general rational, and the selection of nuclear/military policy is from several rational options provided by civilian or military strategists. In other words, mutual deterrence and nuclear strategy are products of rationality, and decision-makers calculate national interests discreetly, even when they are under immediate threat. Moreover, mutual deterrence, which serves better interests of a state, comprises two main dimensions: credibility and capacity. While credibility mostly means psychological and political influences, capacity refers to more than the physical impact, and includes the real force to materialise military commitments or threat. In general, capacity is the foundation of credibility, and credibility increases in proportion to capacity.[1] Table.1 Two Dimensions of Military Deterrence credibility capacity nature psychological physical major implication political military Both credibility and capacity have nuclear and conventional components, with the former far more appalling than the latter. Nuclear Credibility means the will, threat or inclination of a state to use nuclear weapons, while Nuclear Capacity implies the real nuclear stockpiles to employ. By contrast, Conventional Credibility refers to the will, threat or inclination to use conventional forces, and Conventional Capacity is the conventional strength to achieve. For a nuclear weapons state, its Credibility includes nuclear and conventional elements, so does its Capacity. To a non-nuclear weapons state, its own nuclear Credibility and Capacity do not exist, but it may enjoy certain benefit of nuclear umbrella effect from other nuclear powers. There are different national interests to a state, which can rationally, but not necessarily independently, chooses the military means in different places according to separate considerations on its national interests. In this paper, the author categories places with non-identical national interests into four groups: Homeland, Places with vital interests (PVI), Places with unessential interests (PUI), and Other Places(OP). By author’s definition, Homeland means the territory of a state. If being attacked, thi 租房子s state will exercise all possible means for retaliation, likely in proportion to the degree of attack. When it comes to nuclear invasions, a nuclear weapons state will need to demonstrate its capacity and credibility, nuclear and conventional to defend its own territory. Places with vital interests (PVI) refer to some points or areas abroad which have significant strategic values to a state. There are usually close political, historical, cultural or economic connections between this state and its Places with vital interests. The Middle East to many Western countries is of such kind of strategic significance. This status, however, does not always remain unchanged, and may vary over time. For example, many colonies are no longer PVIs to Britain today. In terms of mutual deterrence, if PVIs of a nuclear weapons state were attacked, this power will express its strong concern and inclination to intervene by conventional forces, and will not exclude the possibility to use nuclear threat against invasions, i.e., to exercise its nuclear credibility. It will not, however, easily use its own nuclear capacity in order to avoid a general or escalated nuclear war. The only exceptional scenario is that some PVIs have been attacked by nuclear weapons, and this nuclear power is bound by a military treaty or other substantial defence agreements, which require the use of nuclear weapons. Yet even so, there is still no absolute guarantee that this power will employ its nuclear capacity at all. The scepticism and worries expressed by the Europeans on American nuclear commitment during the Cold War period can explain this point. Whether or not this power will honour its commitments to PVIs is purely out of its own consideration on national interests, not on morality or other ethic reasons at the time of conflicts. Places with unessential interests (PUI) are those tactical areas with somewhat political, economic or military interests, but without crucial strategic values. Nuclear weapons states will normally avoid nuclear conflicts in these places. No nuclear commitment therefore can be expected. However, a state may engage in a conventional warfare in order to protect its interests in these places. For Other Places (OP), which comprise places other than three categories mentioned above, nuclear weapons states will unlikel 住商房屋y offer any substantial military commitment, namely capacity. Nevertheless, in some cases, in order to expand its sphere of interests, this state may demonstrate its conventional credibility on them, probably in the names of humanitarian aids or counterterrorism. Table.2 Relations of Capacity and Credibility with Different Places Homeland PVI PUI OP Nuclear Capacity √ Nuclear Credibility √ Conventional Capacity √ Conventional Credibility √ Accordingly, several simple two-dimensional figures can illustrate deterrence relations in the following pages. Before further analysis, there are some other notions that need to be clarified. Firstly, military development is not always linear and progressive. It might sometimes fluctuate or even go backward. The reason that author uses smooth straight lines just to simplify the whole process of evolution. Actually, in the long run, some fluctuations will not be so notable as first seen, and could be ignored in a macro viewpoint. Secondly, military development of a state is never static but dynamic. That means at a given time, different countries may very likely have separate military developments, or similar military developments of two countries can possibly occur in different periods. The reason that the author puts development lines of two states in one figure is to compare their routes of evolution. This is not, as previously noted, to assume that such developments occurred at the same time. Finally, the author has to admit that the degree of credibility or capability is not easy to be shown by absolute numbers. It can, however, be understood that by comparison, there is still a numerical order on both scales. Fig.1 Nuclear Deterrence for Homeland As illustrated, the deterrent development of a state is shown as the red line, called as Line of Deterrence (LOD). Axes Y and X represent the degrees of credibility and capability without absolute numbers respectively. Horizontal Line C1 is named as a standard of Hard Nuclear Deterrence (HND), which means the state has obtained sufficient nuclear deterrent for its Homeland. Such deterrence should at least include the capacity of resisting the first strike and launching the second strike for the Ho 裝潢meland. In practice, that when a state gets across this threshold depends on the case-by-case basis. Some countries may merely need the Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) or bombers, but some may need Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) or SLBM (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles). Considerations of who the adversaries are and what weapons they have are crucial to decide this standard. Point T, which is the convergence of LOD and Line C1, separates military development stages of a state, i.e., Stage a (Sa) and Stage b (Sb), before and after its acquisition of HND. Before LOD reaches Line C1, this state has not yet acquired sufficient nuclear deterrent, so that limited and conventional war is a more acceptable option to the decision-makers if a military conflict or war is inevitable on its Homeland. While passing this threshold, further nuclear development can only generate marginal effects of deterrence for this nuclear power’s Homeland. More investment on nuclear capacity cannot provide additional credibility as well. The reason is not difficult to understand: If ten nuclear weapons are sufficient for Homeland defence, a hundred will not make a bigger difference than that. It would be helpful to add some more discussion about Line C1 here. Firstly, Line C1 varies time to time. However, the change of Line C1, which does not simply refer to ordinary upgrades of weapons, involves in significant developments of not only the nuclear warheads, but also their delivery and countermeasure systems. Secondly, the creation of Line C1 is basically out of mutual deterrence. That means it has to be decided by bilateral, or in some more complicated cases, multilateral relations, Fig. 2 Deterrence in the Places with Vital Interests In PVIs, the increase of nuclear capacity will accordingly enhance nuclear credibility of this nuclear weapons state after passing the threshold Line C1. This phenomenon is commonly called as the effect of “nuclear umbrella”. There is a threshold of the nuclear development in PVIs as well, and is shown as Line C2, which refers to a certain nuclear sufficiency of this nuclear power in one of its PVIs, say Place X. Because Line C2 is a spillover effect, it cannot be established before Line C1. Another fundamental difference between Lines C1 關鍵字廣告and C2 is that Line C2 is not generated by this nuclear state and its enemies only. The Place X itself has some influences in the formulation of Line C2. But it is possible that if Place X is the PVI of more than one nuclear powers, the establishment of Line C2 will still be mostly the product of mutual deterrence between or among nuclear powers. More features of Line C2 will be discussed later. Fig. 3 Deterrence in the PUIs and OPs In PUIs and OPs, as shown above, the use of nuclear weapons is unlikely because these places are less important to this nuclear power. The increase of conventional capacity will proportionally add credibility after passing its threshold of Line C1 in this Place however. Thanks to the exclusion of nuclear options, LOD is not possible to reach Line C2, which watermarks the distinction between nuclear and conventional deterrence of this nuclear power in PUIs and OPs. Fig. 4 Combined Deterrence for the Homeland In Figure 1, conventional development has not been considered into LOD. If nuclear and conventional deterrents of a state have been considered as a whole, they would be shown as Figure 4. Despite the marginality of nuclear development, it is found that there is some increase of credibility for the Homeland in Stage b. Such an increase is mostly out of the improvement of conventional forces. Fig. 5 Bilateral Deterrence in a PVI, X From Figure 5, it is clearly observed that these two nuclear weapons states (State A and State B) have both reached the nuclear threshold, Line C2 in Place X. Line C2 is called as the standard of Soft Nuclear Deterrence (SND), which means each of the nuclear states can effectively exercise its nuclear deterrence in Place X. Similar to HND, SND is not absolute at all, and it may change if there is a significant promotion of nuclear technology at either side. A simple comparison, as the author believes, can help readers understand about the nature of Lines C1 and C2. Table.3 Natures of Lines C1 and C2 Line C1 Line C2 Place of occurrence Homeland PVI Timing of occurrence Prior Later Nature of Deterrence Hard Nuclear Deterrence (with nuclear capacity and credibility) 禮服Soft Nuclear Deterrence (with nuclear credibility) Concerned Parties Competing nuclear powers Competing nuclear powers and the PVI itself Case Studies: three crises Fig.6 USSR’s Converted SND in China in the 1950s In the 1950s, without national nuclear weapons, the effectiveness of the Soviet Soft Nuclear Deterrence (SND) played an important role in China’s military actions.[2] In Figure 6, after the Soviet Union had reached Line C2 in China, which was then one of its PVI, the Soviet nuclear capacity over China, namely SND would be converted to enhance Chinese military deterrence due to the 1950 bilateral defence treaty between these two Communist countries and more importantly, political need. Although the PRC in this period possessed only conventional forces, the nuclear umbrella effect considerably promoted the PRC’s deterrence, shown as PRC’s dotted line. This enhanced deterrence also substantially narrowed the military gap between the US and PRC. Such projection of nuclear deterrence from Moscow, as shown in Figure 7 even with different degree of reliability, lasted until the break-up with the Soviets.[3] However, according to theories and models discussed previously, Soviet SND would make real sense only if the PRC were suffering nuclear attacks. Fig.7 China’s Assumption of Sino-American Deterrence in China in the 1950s In such context, the author would like to examine three Sino-American crises in the 1950s: the Korean War (1950-3), the first (1954-5) and second (1958) Taiwan Strait crises. None of them was eventually escalated into a nuclear scale of war, but nuclear scenarios were considered by both sides in every situation with different emphasis. The Korean War The Korean War, called by the Chinese Communists as “the War of Resisting the US and Aiding the North Korea” (Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng) is the first large regional war after WW II. Mao asserted on 12 September 1953 that in the Korean War, the PRC had learned some significant lessons and expressed his view on the international trend after War.[4] He specifically mentioned of “the policy of benevolence” covering those of the PRC’s PVIs. Similar to America’s commitment to South Korea and Japan, there was no doubt that both the US and PRC valued the K 酒肉朋友orea peninsula as a PVI. In terms of military deterrent, the US had already been a super power with increasing nuclear stockpiles, but the PRC had only exhausted troops and outdated conventional armament after the Chinese Civil War (1946-1949). During the course of war, proposals of using atomic bombs were continuously raised in Washington although eventually the Americans decided not to escalate to that level. Without real employment of nuclear weapons, however, President Eisenhower, in his memoirs, Mandate for Change believed that it was US nuclear deterrent drawing the Chinese to the negotiation table.[5] According to American assumptions, the strategic confrontation should be like Figure 8, in which US forces with nuclear deterrent went against Chinese outmoded conventional forces. Fig.8 American Assumptions of the US-PRC Confrontation in Korea For some analysts, however, the 1950 treaty between the Moscow and Beijing has undeniably produced a major deterrence, which prevented the PRC from American nuclear attacks. Backed by Soviet SND, the PRC could well rest its war plans under Soviet nuclear umbrella shown as Figure 9. Even so, there was still a huge military gap between the US and an enhanced PRC LODs, mostly due to China’s lag of advanced conventional weapons. Fig.9 Chinese Assumptions of the US vs. PRC Confrontation in Korea The worst-case scenario that the US would least like to expect was direct Soviet military involvement in the Korean War. In Figure 10, there was little doubt that LOD of the US is higher than that of the PRC, or even that of the USSR in Korea because of America’s technological superiority, nuclear and conventional, in this period. However, it was also very likely that the USSR and PRC military combination might be stronger than America military presence. As such, it would not be proper to wipe out, if possibly, the PRC/ North Korea forces off the Korea peninsula since that the USSR, which had no other deputy troops to send, might be forced to intervene then. The military superiority in Figure 8 or 9 would be reversed to a disadvantageous Figure 10. Meanwhile, American electorates were increasingly becoming less and less tolerant towards this protracted campaign. This was the reason why to the US Government, armistice negotiation with the PRC was of necessity even though 澎湖民宿the Chinese were retreating. Fig.10 USSR/PRC vs. US Deterrence in Korea Despite the bloody combats in the battlefields, it should be noted that the US had somehow expressed sort of self-constraint during the process of war. Indeed, American attitude towards the PRC was relatively cautious, particularly after the relief of MacArthur. President Truman had made it clear that he did not want to expand the scope of war so that he rejected Chiang Kai-shek’s proposal of using Kuomintang (KMT) armies in Korea. With this, however, the PRC still suffered a tremendous loss in the Korean War. Its political archrival, Chiang’s KMT by contrast benefited much from this confrontation by US announcement on continuing military and political support to Taiwan, although these had not been realised as a chance to recover Mainland China. The first Taiwan Strait crises The struggles between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and KMT have been a long story. Since 1949, while the CCP consolidating its grip in Mainland China, the exiled KMT had still held Taiwan (Formosa), Penghu (Pescadores Islands), Jinmen (Quemoy) and Mazu (Matsu) islands as bases for a comeback. After the Korean War, Taiwan question had become a perturbation in the US and PRC strained relationship, which was later tested by two serious CCP vs. KMT military confrontations with American involvement. In both occasions, the US responded with military actions, including nuclear threats, to support Chiang’s position. But due to Taiwan’s declining value to the US, Washington’s nuclear deterrence was remarkably diminishing. Americans’ attitude towards Taiwan was not always consistent. After failing to mediate between the CCP and KMT, President Truman was determined to avoid further involvement in the Chinese Civil War and prepared to abandon Chiang Kai-shek’s regime. In the 1948 election year, Truman was harshly under attack by the Republicans, who charged that Roosevelt had sold out East Europe and Truman had tried to sell out China. Being afraid that Congress would vote against his European Security plan, Truman was grudgingly obliged to keep on providing the KMT with economic and military aids. Two weeks after his being elected, however, he abruptly turned down Chiang’s request 褐藻醣膠 for more aids. On 5 January 1950, President Truman announced that Taiwan was a part of China and the US will not involve in the disputes in the Taiwan Strait. Such announcement implied that the US would not intervene and provide military assistance to the KMT troops if the PLA were to attack Taiwan. His Secretary of State, Dean Acheson also excluded Taiwan from the US defence zone in the pacific region in a statement of 12 January. Simply speaking, before the outbreak of the Korean War, Taiwan was at most classified as one of US Places with unessential interests even though Washington still kept its diplomatic ties with Taipei. According to models discussed previously, all American deterrents against the Communist bloc for Taiwan would be conventional. Fig.11 US Deterrence in Taiwan before the Korean War Knowing this, the PRC started to mobilise its Huadong and Xibei Field Armies in Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces for military attack on Taiwan. When the Korean War broke out in June 1950, nevertheless, President Truman drastically changed his tones and reacted immediately by declaring the neutralisation of the Taiwan Strait on 27 June, which denied the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan. The Seventh Fleet was sent to the Strait under orders to prevent any invasion to Taiwan, but such action also deterred KMT troops from attacking on Mainland China. In January 1951, the US government resumed its military aids to Taiwan. The Mutual Defence and Assistance Agreement with Taipei was signed on 10 February. A Military Assistant Advisory Group (MAAG) was also dispatched to Taiwan and began operation in May. From then on, Taiwan was under de facto military protection of the US and became a part of the Western camp in the cold war structure. The Korean War was indeed a genuine turning point, which altered the fate of the KMT regime.        The US furthermore declared the doctrine of massive retaliation, proposed by Secretary of State John F. Dulles after the armistice of the Korean War. The American Government also clearly pointed out that it would not allow any other new aggression “like that in Korea, or if the Korean War itself were resumed, the US would not feel bound again to restrict to non-use of nuclear weapons.”[6] In other words, under this doctrine, the .msgcontent .wsharing ul li { text-indent: 0; } 分享 Facebook Plurk YAHOO! 永慶房屋  .

          16檔投信吃貨 選後黑馬-豐興 裕隆 義隆 中橡 季底做帳行情先鋒 【李亮萱╱台北報導】蘋果日報 選前變數加上美股震盪，近期台股指數震盪下滑，不過，隨著大選不確定因素將除，投信業者已伺機布局航運、資產、中概及部分電子股，加碼包括豐興（2015）、裕隆（2 濾桶201）、義隆（2458）、中橡（2104）等16檔個股，為選後季底做帳行情做準備。法人建議，這周若大盤拉回至8021點，將是投資人進場布局的好時機。 悄悄布局上周台股不敵國際股市慘跌，單周指數下 seo跌369點，周K線在之前連續4連紅後，再度翻黑。德盛安聯台灣智慧趨勢基金經理人鍾兆陽表示，台股近期震盪的走勢主要來自市場對於美國經濟衰退疑慮加深，以及國內總統大選前的不確定提高。加上距離總統大選只剩5個交易 居酒屋日，在政治上不確定的因素增加下，投資人態度轉為保守。 不過，隨著第1季即將結束，投信季底做帳腳步加快，積極布局選後利多產業，包括航運、資產、金融、中概族群，投信都有明顯買超。台壽保投信投資研究部基金經理葉泰宏指出，由?融資韝策~電子類股受到歐美股市拖累，以往具有季底做帳行情的LED、IC設計、太陽能等中小類股今年遭受冷落，取而代之的為資產、營建、航運、觀光類股。 中概股選後不看淡 葉泰宏說，由於大選將至，近期大盤恐有一波拉回，不過這些類股因為具有內需?酒店經紀峔漵介}放題材，即使近日震盪，也只是高檔整理，預估選後股價在兩岸開放政策明確下，較能獲得支撐。 8021點可進場布局 大慶證券分析師陳唯泰指出，雖然離大選只剩1周，投資人操作上相當謹慎，且在美股前景不明震盪加劇下，台股也呈大幅震盪，但此時卻是投信布局?591n時機，一旦選舉結果符合市場預期，3月最後一周將可望產生慶祝行情，投信季底做帳就可順勢啟動。因此，陳唯泰認為，若這周大盤未跌破波段漲幅0.5位置的8021點，投資人就可進場布局。統一證券分析，其中，強勢股義隆在上周的攻堅過程中無法越過季線是一大敗筆，值得後市觀察。日前行?信用貸款F院通過金融業參股大陸後，指標股富邦金（2881）雖然未能適時轉強，但若富邦金後市能以季線為基礎向上盤堅，則有利金融股再上層樓。不過，在籌碼上，投資人可以留意近期外資及投信積極加碼的合庫（5854）及第一金（2892）等。 資產營建通膨題材 台灣工銀證券投顧研究員張瑞暉認為，今年 烤肉在人民幣帶動亞洲貨幣升值趨勢下，新台幣將持續升值，且原物料持續上漲，通膨預期將提供營建資產增值題材良好環境。此外張瑞暉預估，今年無論何黨候選人當選總統，都將優先開放陸資投資台灣商業不動產，在兩岸關係有效改善下，將吸引國際及大陸資金投資台灣不動產市場，整體銷售率及房價將較去年提升。張瑞暉說，其中在台 訂做禮服北市具商業不動產及住宅推案的營建個股，例如，華固（2548）、長虹（5534）、遠雄（5522）、宏普（2536），及具土地資產的台肥（1722）、裕隆、潤泰新（9945）個股將優先受惠，值得投資人留意。 .msgcontent .wsharing ul li { text-indent: 0; } 分享 Facebook Plurk YAHOO! 負債整合  .

          MSCI調降權重 鴻海200元關卡失守 【杜蕙蓉／台北報導】 工商時報 鴻海（2317）屋漏偏逢連夜雨！儘管十月營收以一千三百多億元改寫 燒烤歷史新高，且預期未來業績仍將持續走高，但在麥格理證券調降評等，加上 設計裝潢MSCI微幅調降權重，昨日三大法人聯袂賣超一萬零八百一十五張，股價再破底，並跌破二 G2000百元關卡，創下一年多來新低價。 其實MSCI這次在半年度調整，並無調整台股權重，但因新增中美晶、伍豐 帛琉、億光、遠傳電、中信證、兆赫和廣宇等十四檔個股，因此，將大型股的鴻海、中鋼、台新金控權重分別微幅調降○．三 21世紀房屋仲介％、○．二％、○．一五％，使鴻海也成了受害人。 而且，稍早麥格理證券將鴻海調降評等，目標價下修到二二○元後，引爆賣壓，總計 辦公室出租外資十一月以來已賣超鴻海十一萬六千張以上，投信也賣超逾六千張，自營商則微幅調節七百張左右，鴻海昨日股價的下跌，也早已跌破外資的修正價格。 租辦公室 麥格理證券分析師張博淇下修鴻海的報告中認為，全球筆電快速取代桌上型電腦，鴻海DT的營收比重逾四五％，未來成長受到限制；另外，富士康受到比亞迪等同業的威脅， 住商房屋不再享有垂直整合的經營優勢；再則其營業成本佔營收比重已降到二％以下，未來沒有太大的Cost down空間。 不過，元大認為鴻海即使二○○八年營收成長將微幅趨緩，預計會由從超過三○?婚禮佈置H下降至二○至二五％的狀況，但其PC和手機二○○八年還是有兩位數成長。 .msgcontent .wsharing ul li { text-indent: 0; } 分享 Facebook Plurk YAHOO! 租房子  .

          燒肉火鍋吃到飽　嚴選食材精緻呈現 吃到飽餐廳向來都很受歡迎，無論是燒肉或是火鍋吃到飽，都讓 土地買賣消費者回味無窮。起源於台北樹林 酒店兼職的大玉門餐廳，將日式燒烤結合紫銅火鍋，並嚴選 商務中心上等食材，無限量供應，因而獲得顧客極高的評價。 創立於1 烤肉999年的大玉門，以「日式燒烤、紫銅火鍋」吃到飽的消費方式受到歡迎，燒肉部分引?膠原蛋白i日本進口炭火烤爐，並精選優質木炭，將食材與炭火完美結合，呈現獨特的清香，充分展現燒烤的迷 房屋出租人的風味，也依食材特性搭配不同的醬料，定期變化菜色滿足顧客的新鮮感。 而象徵大富大貴的紫銅鍋，亦特選穩定 褐藻醣膠性高的木炭，充分保留食材原味，特製成鴛鴦鍋的方式，也提高選擇性，有清湯、麻辣、泡菜、藥膳、咖哩、味噌、素菜等十餘湯頭可做選?宜蘭民宿隉C 大玉門本著「燒烤不只是一種飲食方式，更是一種生活調劑」的態度，創造出復古、歡樂的和諧氣氛，建立美味與健康的好口碑，希望來店的顧客都?借貸鄖犮峎飽B享受火烤兩吃的樂趣。 大玉門日式燒烤紫銅火鍋http://0423111177.travel-web.com.tw/ 引用【大台灣旅遊網 TTNews 邵鈺敏】 酒店工作  .

          990426運動及休閒女鞋流行資訊: 這是99.04.26日,亮亮上網血拼,覺得不錯看的運動及休閒女鞋 ,報給水水們一同分享: ＊ 宜蘭民宿超人氣款楔型鞋＊ ＊縫線設計，曲線更細緻＊ ＊跳色 墾丁民宿的搭配，活力又出色＊ 運動風時尚百搭單品 超in時尚美鞋領先上市 ＊?日月潭民宿蘤５皕井狡c穿出活力＊ ＊絕妙的甜美辛辣平衡＊ ＊拉長您的身高，曲線更明顯＊ 麻辣鍋 特製帆布搭配質感出色的深色麂皮 顯現與眾不同的質量感受 耐磨的環保橡膠大底及舒適的內裏 絕對 麻辣火鍋讓你物超所值的感受 基本款帆布鞋 普普藝術設計 鮮黃色系活力十足 耐磨橡膠大底 深淺的同 火鍋吃到飽色調配色是四季都吸晴的帆布鞋，除了活潑的氛圍還有一種說不出的有層次感的風情! 自然色調的棉布與略帶狂野的豹紋楔型跟相互輝映 盤纏銀兩，勾勒出一抹屬於甜心的小小性感，讓你時尚、可愛隨心所欲~~ 喜洋洋的大紅，圓圓的前緣，很得人緣!以白色滾邊帶出青春的活力，簡單大方，就是愛KEDS 金瓜石民宿! 有興趣的水水們都可以點擊圖文進去看喔! 註:1. 亮亮的服裝配飾,及各種流行時尚及人氣商品資訊,純屬個人覺得是不錯的資訊,po圖文推薦供眾水水及網友們一同分享,並非從事營利或?九份民宿籇?特此聲明! 2.圖文如有侵權,請留言告知,以便刪除! 謝謝~~   .msgcontent .wsharing ul li { text-indent: 0; } 分享 Facebook Plurk YAHOO! 澎湖民宿  .

          10月25日 十載Show台灣-歐吉尚經典再推薦(票選開始) 「十年精彩，十年重現」感謝所有陪著歐吉尚遊台灣成長的觀眾們，在這三立台灣台十週年慶，歐吉尚遊台灣將推出一系列特別企劃喔~準備將這幾年來歐吉尚所踏遍的北、中、南、東台灣十大必遊景點，再次精采呈現給觀眾朋友們~您一定要看喔…嘿嘿~這一趟歐吉尚要帶各位來趟時光之旅！繫好你的安全帶，跟著歐吉尚的腳步，我們要出發囉~南台灣十大必遊景點：『TOP 10』尖山埤-江南度假村：不要懷疑！沒錯！排行榜中?買房子漲翰n渡假村他的盛名美景可是媲美為「福爾摩沙的小江南 」喔。『TOP 9』東港-東隆宮：你要改運嗎？全國四大古廟之一的東隆宮，是東港居民信仰的核心所在，香火鼎盛更吸引許多遊客慕名前來駐足改運。『TOP 8』三地門-蜻蜓雅築：結合三地門本身的自然景觀與原住民排灣族的文化主題來創作的作品。隨著國片的帶動更是目前最夯最強手的伴手裡喔。『TOP 7』金門：絕對值得您親身前往一窺金門生態的奧祕?面膜C無論經過多少歷史的痕跡、永遠令人尊敬懷念的老地方。『TOP 6』四重溪-清泉山莊：有著傳統日式風味的清泉山莊，讓你一踏進山莊就彷彿置身五O年代的感受喔。『TOP 5』墾丁休閒飛靶射擊場：經濟不景氣！你有一肚子怨氣嗎？最新宣洩方式，趕緊到墾丁射擊場一吐為快吧。『TOP 4』澎湖：哇~看看歐吉尚歐巴尚水中漫步悠閒的景象，看了你能不心動嗎？。『TOP 3』大社-碳烤地瓜：唉唷~看的我口水直流，可別小看這小小 買屋網一攤蜜地瓜喔！在老闆用心愛心的經營下，是目前最夯的養身聖品喔。『TOP 2』曾文水庫：人氣指數最高的風景地，可是被列為新南瀛十勝景觀之一喔。。『TOP 1』鏘鏘!!南台灣排行榜中的榜首，南橫-檜谷：當一株株千年巨大的檜木，聳立在雲際中，絕對令你驚嘆造物的神奇偉大。你有多久沒深呼吸了！趕快一起來南橫大口深呼吸吧! 「十年精彩，十年重現」歐吉尚用心推薦、『南台灣十大必遊景點』，內容絕對精彩！千萬別錯過這星期六晚上 辦公室出租十點，超級優質的「歐吉尚遊台灣」哦！南橫檜谷聯絡資訊位置：台20線141公里處在南橫公路沿途的森林中，一株株千年巨大的檜木，聳立在雲際中，令人驚嘆造物的神奇偉大。沿途林木茂密、古木參天，這些由紅檜、鐵杉、扁柏所組成的原始檜木林區，是南橫最大最完整的原始森林區。 曾文水庫聯絡資訊台南縣楠西鄉密枝村70號06-5753251 管理處消費資訊營業時間: 平日AM08：00~PM16：45假日 延長至AM18：00曾文水庫是台灣最大之水庫，主要功能為調節 景觀設計及供水效能。由於集水區域廣闊，極目遠眺，碧綠萬頃，壯麗無比，因以「曾水煙波」被列為新南瀛十勝景觀之一。 高山炭烤地瓜聯絡資訊高雄縣大社鄉神農村翠屏路112巷2號07-351-3696 高壽龍消費資訊營業時間：每週六、日AM06:30~PM20:3(可宅配)位在觀音山風景區山腳下，一家平凡的地瓜專賣店，因老闆的妻子喜愛吃地瓜，所以在20年前老闆決心投入賣地瓜的行業，更研究開發了不同的烤爐，讓炭烤地瓜的技術更加精進。 澎湖海底漫步聯絡資訊澎湖縣西嶼鄉外垵村1之 關鍵字排名4號06-9982728 邱元進消費資訊活動行程約兩個小時（含換衣、坐船），海底漫步體驗時間約10~15分鐘。“海底漫步”顛覆傳統的潛水方式，是個不必耗費長時間練習的水底活動，可潛下約水深三至五米左右，藉由教練的指導穿戴類似太空人的頭盔，沿著水面下潛入水中即可。 墾丁休閒飛靶射擊場聯絡資訊恆春鎮網紗里坑內仔路七號08-8892266 郭茂鐘消費資訊營業時間：AM09：00–PM18：00(需預約)為推廣射擊運動，開放一般民眾以及愛好者體驗。可體驗實彈射擊的震撼教育，更是屏東地區唯一參照?貸款纗B模式的休閒飛靶射擊，還有專業教練一對一的教學體驗射擊，現在已成為世界級的運動了。 四重溪-清泉溫泉山莊聯絡資訊屏東縣車城鄉溫泉村文化路５號 08-8824120 王樹嘉消費資訊營業時間：全年無休、住宿需預約、大眾池泡湯(開放時間:6:00-23:00)、湯屋24小時五○年代的五星級套房，傳統日式風味只有在清泉山莊。清泉山莊是最早的溫泉源頭出水處，清澈的原泉百年來源源不絕，水溫長年保持於５０度至８０度之間，含多種礦物質，經常浸泡對身體極佳 金門聯絡資訊金門縣金寧鄉伯玉路二段460號082-3 賣屋13100消費資訊營業時間：早上8:30-晚上17:00乳山遊客中心為金門國家公園一棟綠建築的教育展示館，規劃為鯨豚區、湖底世界區、潮間帶區、鳥類區…等，還有三、四十年留下來的戰爭遺跡，透過文史資料的呈現，讓遊客一窺金門生態的奧祕及了解戰爭發生的經過。 蜻蜓雅築聯絡資訊屏東縣三地門鄉三地村中正路二段九號 08-7992856 黃逸珍消費資訊營業時間: 早上8：00~晚上20：00(全年無休)位於屏東縣三地門鄉青山環繞的綠野中，負責人施秀菊老師除了對傳統琉璃珠的研究與創新外，並結合三地門本身的自然景觀與原住民排灣族 東森房屋的深厚文化，朝向咖啡、人文、藝術、美食的主題來營造工作室。 東隆宮聯絡資訊屏東縣東港鎮東隆里東隆街21-1號08-832-2374 吳瑞麟消費資訊改運時間:9:00-11:30 15:30-17:30 20:00-22:30(隨意添香油錢)為全國四大古廟之一，是東港居民信仰的核心所在。西元1894年此地遭逢大水，經居民鳩工協成，再度恭請溫王爺坐鎮於此，從此香火鼎盛。東隆宮廟前的班頭衙役輪班當值，常吸引遊客前來駐足改運。 .msgcontent .wsharing ul li { text-indent: 0; } 分享 Facebook Plurk YAHOO! 襯衫  .

          各星座適用的顏色 白羊座：基本顏色是紅色代表熱情和活力. 友誼用黃色 愛情用棕色 工作用黑色 財運用橙色 學業用綠色 金牛座：基本顏色?面膜O橙色代表富裕與安定. 友誼用銀色 愛情用紫色 工作用藍色 財運用黃色 學 農地貸款業用黑色 雙子座：基本顏色是黃色代表新奇與變化. 友誼用金色 愛情用綠色 工作用粉紅?保濕面膜?財運用銀色 學業用藍色 巨蟹座：基本顏色是銀色代表柔和與親切. 友誼用白色 愛情用黑色 工作用紅色 財 烤肉運用金色 學業用粉紅色 獅子座：基本顏色是金色代表尊貴和寬大. 友誼用棕色 愛情用藍色 工作用橙色 財運用白色 學業用?買屋網鶡?處女座：基本顏色是白色代表純潔和完美. 友誼用紫色 愛情用粉紅色 工作用黃色 財運用棕色 學業用橙色 天秤座：基本顏色是橙色代表通融?售屋網P協調. 友誼用綠色 愛情用紅色 工作用銀色 財運用紫色 學業用黃色 天蠍座：基本顏色是紫色代表神秘和魅力. 友誼用黑色 愛情用橙色 工作用金色 財運用 有巢氏房屋綠色 學業用銀色 射手座：基本顏色是綠色代表自然與和平. 友誼用藍色 愛情用黃色 工作用白色 財運用黑色 學業用金色 摩羯座：基本顏色是黑色代表責任和毅力. 友誼用粉紅色 愛 酒店打工情用銀色 工作用棕色 財運用藍色 學業用白色 水瓶座：基本顏色是藍色代表智慧與理想. 友誼用紅色 愛情用金色 工作用紫色 財運用粉紅色 學業用棕色 雙魚座：基本顏色是粉紅色代表浪漫和犧牲 西裝外套. 友誼用橙色 愛情用白色 工作用綠色 財運用紅色 學業用紫色   .msgcontent .wsharing ul li { text-indent: 0; } 分享 Facebook Plurk YAHOO! 房屋出租  .